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I

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
LYNN TEEPLES,
-vs.-

Plaintiff-Appellant,

DON CHOQUETTE,

Def enda1Ytt,

Case
No.10324

JUDGE MEL HUMPHERYS,

Garnishee, Respondent.

BRIEF O,F RESPONDENT
NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant Lynn Teeples appeals from a judgment
of the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Judge, Third Jutlicial District, denying the appellant a garnishee judgment against the respondent Mel Humpherys, a Justice of the Peace in Salt Lake County, Utah.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Tlte District Court of the Third Judicial District
ruled that the appellant was not entitled to a garnishee
1

judgment against the respondent for bail mouey wliiC'li
the respondent held in his capacity as a justice of the
peace and ·which he returned to the defendant in a eriminal case, who had apparently deposited the money with
him.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent contends that the Third Distriet
Court's ruling, denying the appellant a garnishee jmlgment, should be affirmed.

STATEI\IENT OF FACTS
The respondent submits the following statemeut of
facts:
On February 21, 1964, the appellant Lynn Teeples
filed a complaint in the District Court of Salt Lake
County against Don Choquette in Case No. 148411. The
plaintiff prayed for $4,000 damages, $1,500 pnnifoe
damages, and attorney's fees in the sum of $730.
On the same day, an affidavit of the appellant was filecl
in support of attachment proceedings before judgment
(R. 1 through 3). On the 21st day of February, 1964, the
appellant obtained a garnishment order from the clerk of
the court to Justice Mel Humpherys (R. 4), directing the
respondent not to pay any debt due or to become clue to
the defendant Don Choquette (R. 4). On July lG, 1964,
Judge Humpherys filed a return on the garnishment, reciting that he was not in any manner indebted to the
2

tlefcndnnt, nor did he have any chattels in his possession
or know of other rights or credits due or to become due.
On the 21st day of July, 1964, the appellant filed a
tm'erse to the garnishment return, alleging that on information aud belief, Judge Humpherys was indebted to
the <lefendant in the sum of $445 (R. 11). Subsequently,
a rr•i]uest for admissions was made and on the 30th day
nf September, 1964, J uclge Humpherys, acting through
the comity attorney, replied to the admissions that prior
to tl1e time the garnishment was served, he had received
a check from the Brigham City Court in the sum of $500,
\rhirh represented the bond of the defendant in the case
of State 0f Utah v. Don Choquette, which was then pending hefore Judge Humpherys (R. 15).
Subsequently, a pretrial order was entered (R. 17
a11d 18) which recited that ·when the garnishment was
~c1Tec1, Judge Humpherys was holding the sum of $500
as bail and that subsequent to the service of the garnishmrnt, Don Choquette 's case was brought on for disposition and he was sentenced to pay a fine of $50. After
applying part of the bail money in satisfaction of the
fine, the $450 remaining was returned to the clef enclant.
On January 29, 1965, Judge Hanson entered judgment, denying the appellant a garnishee judgment
a~'<iinst Judge Humpherys. Judge Hanson ruled that
1'1nsmuch as the garnishment had been served on the
~2nd clay of February, 1964, when the case against Don
l'hoquette ·was still pending, the ans>vers to the interro~ntorie:;; in the garnishment were properly anS"wered in
3

the negative; and since the criminal case against Don
Choquette was not determined until February 26, 1964,
a garnishee judgment would be improper.
Everything in the record supports the conclusioll
that respondent held the funds in question as a justice
of the peace and that he ·was operating as a dulv constituted, judicial officer in a criminal case.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED
THE APPELLANT'S REQUEST FOR A GARNISHEE JUDGMENT, SINCE:
(a) TO HA VE GRANTED A GARNISHEE
JUDGMENT WOULD HA VE BEEN
CONTRARY TO JUDICIAL IMMUNITY.
(b) THE RESPONDENT ACTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE STATUTORY
MANDATE.
(c) A BAIL DEPOSIT IN THE HANDS OF
A MAGISTRATE IS NOT SUBJECT TO
GARNISHMENT FOR ATTACHMENT
PURPOSES WHERE THE LIABILITY
OF THE DEPOSITOR REMAINS CONTINGENT.
( d) BAIL ON DEPOSIT WITH A JUDICIAL
OFFICER MAY NOT BE THE SUBJECT OF GARNISHMENT.
4

(a) It is a well-established rule that judges are not
civilly liable for acts performed as part of their judicial
Lluties. In 30A, Am. Jur., Judges, Section 73, it is stated:
"It is the general rule that where a judge has
jurisdiction he is not civilly liable for acts done
in the exercise of his judicial function.''
In Marks v. Sullivan, 9 Utah 12, 33 Pac. 224 (1893),
the Territorial Supreme Court ruled that a justice of
the peace, acting within his jurisdiction and in good
faith, is not civilly liable for acts performed in such
capacity. The court noted that a justice of the peace
is not liable for mere errors in judgment and could not
necessarily know a judicial fact until a full hearing on
the issue ·was heard.
In Allen v. Holbrook, 103 Utah 319, 135 P. 2d 242
(1943), this court, without reference to the Marks decision, ruled that a justice of the peace, acting as a magistrate, when exercising a judicial function, is not liable
for damages occasioned by his actions. Further, the
law has generally recognized that it is immaterial
11hether the judge is of an inferior court or a superior
C'Ourt. 48 C.J.S., Judges, Sec. 63b.

In the instant case, the respondent is a constitutional officer. Being a justice of the peace, he is cloaked
11ith the judicial power of the State of Utah. Article
\1II, Section 1, Constitution of Utah. His involvement in the present case was as a judge, and the garnishment that was served upon him was served upon
him, not as an individual, but as a judge or justice of
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the peace. At the time of the receipt of the garnishment, the respondent had in his possession only a chi_
posit in lieu of bail. At that time, it was necessary for
him to determine whether or not a bail deposit, receiver!
under the circumstances evident in this case, could he
the subject of a garnishment. At the time the garnishment return was received, the criminal case, pe!Hling before the justice, had not been determineu. Further, subsequent to the time the case was determined,
the justice was required to exercise his judgment as to
whether or not the statutory mandate, requiring him to
return the bail deposit to the defendant, should be complied with or whether the garnishment request should
be honored. In making a determination in accordance
with the statutory mandate, as will appear below, a
judicial function was involved.

It is well settled that a garnishment proceeding,
when it involves a state officer, absolves the sovereign
state and its officers from suit. 114 A.L.R. 261. Tl1is
being so, and it appearing that the respondent in the
instant case acted in a judicial capacity, it is apparei1t
that a garnishee judgment may not now be entered
against him.
(b) In the instant case, a bond was not deposited
with the justice of peace, but rather a deposit instead of
bail was made in accordance with Section 77-43-19.
U.C.A., 1953. Subsequent to the determination of the
criminal case pending against Don Choquette, the respondent had no other alternative but to comply 'rith
6

the statutory mandate in cases where a deposit in lieu
of bail has been made. Section 77-43-21, U.C.A., 1953,
provides:
"vVhen money has been so deposited, if it remains on deposit at the time of a judgment for the
payment of a fine, the clerk must, under the direction of the court, apply the money in satisfaction thereof, and after satisfying the fine and
costs, must refund the surplus, if any, to the defendant." (Emphasis added)

!

The respondent, therefore, was compelled by statute
to subtract court costs and the fine imposed against Don
Choquette, and return the rest of the deposit to Mr. Choquette. Had he failed to comply with that statute, he
may have been violating a duty imposed by statute and
thus be liable to Don Choquette.

The provision of the Utah statute is similar to
Section 1297 of the California Penal Code. In Mundell
r. Wells, 181 Calif. 398, 184 Pac. 666 (1919), a suit was
brought by an assignee of money deposited with the
clerk of a magistrate in a criminal case. Subsequent
to disposition of the case, the court applied the bail
money in satisfaction of the fine and paid the remainder
orer to the defendant rather than the assignee. The
court ruled that the clerk acted properly in dispensing
; the money to the defendant. The court cited Section
1297 of the California Penal Code, requiring the refunding of the surplus of any deposit to the defendant. The
court noted that as between the contesting parties, a determination in equity may sometimes be made but cited
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Way v. Day, 187 Mass. 476, 73 N.E. 543, for the proposition that no claim could be made against the sovereign
that bail money should be turned over to any third
person.

In Wright and Taylor v. Daughterty, 138 Iowa HJ.'i,
115 N.W. 908, the court held that money deposited as
bail could not be reached by judgment creditors by
garnishee proceedings following the dismissal of au iudictment. The court said that the bail statute in Iowa
only required the court to hold the money for bail and
for satisfaction of any fine imposed, and did not require
it to honor any other claims. The Utah statute is Rimilar to Section 765.4 of the Iowa Code of 1950.
Since the statutory mandate states that the clerk
or court "must" refund any surplus to the defendant, ii
is obvious that the court in this case could not be held
liable for complying with the statutory requirement.
(c) Rule 64(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, allows garnishment prior to trial, and it is, of course, rec-

ognized that the debt need not be due at the timP lhe
garnishment for attachment purposes is serYed. Ho\1ever, it is well settled that under Utah law, the liability
of the garnishee to account to the clef enclant must 1Je
absolute at the time the garnishment is serncl. Thus,
in Acheson-Harder Co. Y. Western Wholesale Notio11s

Co., 72 Utah 323, 269 Pac. 1032 (1928), it is stated:
"It is one of the cardinal principles of the law
of garnishment that the garnishee is under no
greater liability to the plaintiff in whose behalf
the writ of garnishment is issued than such gnr-

8

nishee was under to the defendant immediately
before the writ was served. The liability of the
garnishee to account to the defendant for property or indebtedness must be absolute, in order
that such property or indebtedness is garnishable.
Shinn on Attachment and Garnishment, vol. 2
§ 643, p. 1059. A fortiori it follows that accounts
placed in the hands of the garnishee for collection,
but not collected, cannot be reached by the service
of a writ of garnishment upon the person having
such accounts in his hands for collection. To reach
such assets of the defendant, the one indebted to
the defendant must be served with the writ. Rood
on Garnishment, § 167, p. 202; 28 C. J. § 201,
p. 160.''
In the instant case, it is obvious that at the time
the garnishment was served, the liability for the return of
any bail was not absolute: (1) It was speculative whether
or not the defendant would in fact appear for trial and
whether or not the bail would have to be forfeited. (2)
The amount of the fine to be imposed, if any, was still
not ascertained.

It is apparent that at the time the garnishment was
served upon the respondent, his liability to the def endant was not absolute. Therefore, the court acted properly
in 111ling that no garnishee judgment could be entered.
(d) The appellant cites a case from North Carolina
for the proposition that the proceeds, returnable to the
defendant, may be attached by garnishment when they
are in the hands of a justice of the peace. White v. Ordille, 229 N.C. 490, 50 S.E. 2d 499. That case is no
preredent for the instant appeal. First, the opinion
9

does not hold that a garnishee judgment may be enteretl
against the officer, but involves only a contest betwee11
the depositor and his creditors. Second, it does not appear that North Carolina has a statute similar to Section 77-43-21, U.C.A., 1953, which would compel the
return of deposited moneys to a defendant. Thin1, the
North Carolina case involved only the question of attachment and garnishment of the residuary portion of the
deposit and did not concern itself with the issue of
whether or not a garnishment served before the residuary
part is in fact determined, can be the basis for an attachment by garnishment of the said residuary part.
Nothing in Utah law allows an attachment by garnishment of bail on deposit in a criminal case, nor is there
any provision which allows a garnishee judgme11t to be
entered against a judicial officer. Although the rules of
civil procedure allow a garnishment to be served upon a
"corporation, private or public," nothing in the rules
mentions a judicial officer nor could the rules authorize a
garnishee judgment against a judicial officer, since sucli
an authorization would be substantiYe rather than procedural, and outside the court's rule-making power.
Further, Rule 64D ( p), Utah Rules of CiYil Procedure, appears to he contrary to the appellant's position.
That rule governs the situation where property is hchl
to secure the performance of some other obligation. The
rule provides that if personal property is held for au:·
other purpose than to secure the payment of mone:r, it
is subject to garnishment only if the plaintiff seeking 1he
garnishment could perform the condition for whiC'h tlw
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deposit is held. In the instant case, the bail was held
to guarantee the appearance of the defendant in a criminal case. This is an obligation that could not have been
performed by the plaintiff. Consequently, the property
under the rules could not be the subject of a garnishment. It may be argued that the term "personal propcrtr" in Rule 64D(p) does not contemplate money. Howerer, the spirit of the rule would seem to be applicable
iu the instant situation.
Sound judicial administration should keep a court,
at whatever level, free of becoming a party to creditors'
elaims or disputes. To allow bail to be the subject of
garnishment or attachment is fraught with serious dangers and could greatly undermine the dignity of the
courts. It is submitted that as a consequence, bail on
deposit ·with the judicial officer should not be deemed
the subject of a garnishment.
CONCLUSION

In the instant case, it is apparent that the trial court
acted properly in refusing the appellant a garnishee judgment. The trial court's ruling can be sustained on numerous bases, not the least of which is sound public policy. It is submitted that this court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted,
PHIL L. HANSEN
Attorney General
RONALD N. BOYCE
Chief Assistant
Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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